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In the Supreme Court of the Stale of Utah 
MARY Y. LARSI~N and 1IARY KA YE 
and SANDRA LEE LARSEN, minors, 
hy their Guardian Ad Litem, MARY 
V. LARSEN, and INTERMOUN-
'l'ATN SERVICJ~J, INC., a Utah Cor-
poration, 
PTaintiffs and Appellants, 
Vii. 
CLOVER D. CHRISTENSEN and 
VERNON L. STEVENSON, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case Ko. 
] 088:3 
This is an action for the wrongful death of plaintiff's 
<focedent which resulted from an intersection collision 
lwtween the motorcycle on which the decedent was riding 
and an automobile mvned by the defendant Vernon L. 
Stevenson, hereinafter referred to as "Stevenson", and 
driven by the defendant Clover D. Christensen, herein-
after referred to as "Christensen". 
DISPOSITION TN LO-WER COURT 
The lower court granted defendant Stevenson's Mo-
tion for a Rummary .Tudgmc>nt upon the ground that as 
2 
a matter of law, defendant Christensen could not have 
been acting as agent for defendant Stevenson at the forn• 
of the accident. 
STATE1\1ENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff's decedent, Kurt E. Larsen, age 28, was 
severely injured on Fehruary 1-1-, 19G3 when struck at 
the intersedion of Tenth East and Ffrst South Streets 
in Ralt Lake City, as he rode motorcycle police escort 
for a funeral procession which was travelling east. He 
di0d l\1arch 30, l 963 of tlw ]wad and chest injnriPs sus-
tained in the accident. 
The accident resulted when Christensen, travelling 
south on Tenth East Street, attempted to squeeze through 
thP cars of the funeral procession and blocked the path 
of Kurt E. LarsPn, who approached the intersection trav-
Plling east on the south sidP of the cars in thP funeral 
process10n. ChristensPn was driving the automohil<• 
owned hy dPfendant StPven:;;on. 
At the tinw of the accident, Christensen was the les-
sPe and opPrator of a service station and had been so ern-
pl oyed since June, 1961 (Christensen deposition, p. 10). 
Stevenson, owner of the car, had patronized Christensen's 
business since August or September of 1961 (Christensen 
deposition, p. 10-11 ). Christensen washed the car on a 
weekly basis and serviced it about twice every month 
3 
(Christensen deposition, p. 15). Except on rare occasions, 
Christensen would pick up the car at Stevenson's place of 
business for the service and then return the car to his 
place of business after the service was completed (Chris-
tensen deposition, p. 15). Christensen never billed or 
eharged for pick up or delivery of the car, this being pro-
vided by him merely as an accommodation to Stevenson 
(Christensen deposition, p. 15 ). 
On the day of the accident, Stevenson requested that 
Christensen install new tie-rod ends on the car, that he 
balance the wheels, wash the car and fill it with gas 
(Christensen deposition, pp. 18-19). 
To carr~' out this request, Christensen drove to Stev-
<>nson's office and pickc>d up the car as he usually did 
( Christt>mwn deposition, p. 21). HP returned the car to 
tlH" sPrvicP station and rPplacPd tht> tit>-rod Pnds. lfr 
tlwn discovered that his wheel-balancing equipment was 
out of ordt>r so called to tht> Phillips G6 Training Station 
loeatt•d at 2263 East 21st South Street and arranged for 
tlwm to do the balancing work (Christensen deposition, 
pp. 21-22). 
To reach the Training Station, Christensen drove 
south on Tt>nth East Street to First South Street wherP 
Jw t>ncountered the funeral procesion proceeding in an 
Pastwardly dirt>ction (Christensen deposition, pp. 2-1-25). 
Christensen thought he could squePze through an opening-
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in the procession (Christensen deposition, pp. 2\i-27) and 
in attempting to do so the collision resulted. 
At the time of the accident, Christensen was driving 
the car pusuant to Stevenson's instructions to get it re-
paired. The trip to the service station, like all other 
trips in the course of dealing between them, was without 
charge to Stevenson and without benefit to Christensen, 
monetary or otherise. The trip was made solely for 
the benefit and convenience of Stevenson and as an 
accommodation to him (Christensen deposition, pp. 23-24, 
49-50). At the time of the accident, Christensen was 
carrying out no business and no purpose of his own 
(Christensen deposition, p. 40). 
X ot\\·ithstanding the total laek of Jwm~fit to Chris-
t<'nsen of the trip and tl11 1 fact that it was undertakPn 
\\'holly for the benE'fit of and rrnrsuant to tlw instructions 
of StPvPnson to gPt thP ear rt>pairPd, the 'Trial Comt 
granted Stevenson's Motion for Smnmary .Jndgnwnt 
holding, as a matter of law, that Christemwn could not 
ltave bePn aeting as agent for Stevenson at thP tinw tlit' 
tweident occurred. This appeal followed. 
ARGUMEN'l"' 
THE LO\Yl£R COFRT ERRED IN GRAN'l'-
ING srMnlARY JrDGMENT BECAUSE 
THE QG1'~STION OF ~\OEXCY SHOULD 
HA YE BI£:E:N SUB~rTTTJ1~D 11() TIU~ JURY. 
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In Ctah, as elsewhere, courts should be reluctant to 
invoke the drastic remedy of a summary judgment, since 
it prevents a litigant from fully presenting his case to 
the courts. Brandt V. Springvillr, Banking Co., 10 e. 2d 
3:JO, 353 P. 2d 460 (1960). Only where the pleadings, 
Pvidence, admissions, and inferences therefrom, when 
yje~wed most favorably to the losing party, show clearly 
that there remains no genuine issue as to any material 
fad, and that the winner is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law, is it proper to grant a summary judgment. 
Such a showing must preclude, as a matter of law, all 
reasonable possibility that the loser could win if given 
a trial. Frederick May & Co. v. Dunn, 13 U 2d 40, 368 
P. 2d 266 (1962). On appeal from a summary judgment 
this Court is obliged to consider the evidence and all 
reasonable inforPnces therPfrom in tlw lig-ht most favor-
able to the losing party. Whitman r. JV. T. Grant Co., 
]() l' 2d 81, 395 p 2d 918 (1964). 
Thus, the plaintiffs, having suffered the entry of 
;;ummary judgments against them, and having been whol-
ly dPprivP<l of thc>ir right to fully pres<•nt their case 
in tlw lowt>r court, are entitled to have their position 
eonsidered on this appeal in a light most favorable to 
them. 
It is well established in Utah that if there is any 
<•Yidence indicating the existence> of an agency relation-
:-hip, the agency issue becomPs a qm .. stion of fart to be 
decided by the jury. Thus, m Goddard v. Lexington 
Motor Co., 63 U. 61, 223 P. 340 (1924), the plaintiff 
sought to hold the defendant liable for the acts of a third 
party whom the plaintiff claimed was the defendant's 
agent. The Trial Court entered a non-suit against the 
plaintiff, finding no agency as a matter of law. 
The Supreme Court reversed the non-suit, and the 
basis of the decision was stated as follows: 
''When any evidence is adduced tending to 
prove the existence of a disputed agency, its exis-
tence or non-existence is as a general rule a ques-
tion of fact for the jury, aided by proper instruc-
tions from the court, even thoiigh the evidence is 
not f111T and sasisf(f('fory. am1 in snch rases it is 
<•nor for tlw conrt to take tlw question from thP 
,jnrY h:· dir0cting a yerdiet h~- instrnetion, hy non-
suit, or hy sustaining a dPnrnr to thr t>videnr<.,'' 
(Emphasis added.) 
ThP quoted rule was n•affirmed in Adantso11 1'. Cnited 
Jfi11e Workers, 3 lT. :2d 37, 277 P. 2d 972 (195-1:), wherein 
the agenc:· qnestion was dt>ridtid as a matter of law onl,\· 
lwcanse there was absolutely no tividence that the alleged 
tort feasors were agents of the defendant since their 
identity was unknown. 
In the present case, there is ample evidence in the 
record from which the trier of fact could determine that 
ChristensPn was acting as the agent of Stevenson at the 
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time of the accident. Therefore under the holding of the 
Ooddard case and other applicable authorities cited her-
after, the agency issue should have~ been submitted to 
the jury. 
·while driving the car, Christensen was engaged in an 
activity separate from and unrelated to the actual repair 
work. The driving was undertaken for the benefit of 
Stevenson without charge (see cases discussed infra). 
11lrns, although Stevenson exercised little or no control 
over the repair work on the car and as to such Christen-
H:'n was clearly an independent contractor, a jury could 
llE:'.Vertheless reasonably conclude that in the driving of 
the car for the benefit and purposes of Stevenson and 
as an accommodation and courtesy for him, without 
compensation, Clu·istensen was aeting as his agent. 
Christl>nst>n statc'd unequivocally that at tlw tirne of 
the aecident he was engaged sold~' in the husinesR ancl 
for tlw lwnefit of Stevenson (Christensen de1Josition, 
Jl. -tO), and that he received no benefit from the trip 
~ince lw was not being paid for the time to driw the 
car to the Training fitation (Christensen deposition, pp. 
:2:3-2-1:, 49-50) and he made no profit or mark up on the 
cl1arge made by the Training Station (Christensen depo-
sition, pp. 23-24, 49). 
Stevenson had authorized and directed Christensen 
to orivP tlw rar to anct from tlw plact> wlwrt> any s<:>rvirP 
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would be rendered and impliedly authorized him to do 
whatever was reasonably required to get the repair work 
done. He was accustomed to not being charged for pick 
up or delivery of the car, although he expected to pay 
for the repair work. 
Apparently the Trial Court was of the opinion that 
since there appeared to be little dispute as to the events 
which surrounded Christensn's driving the car at the 
time of the accident or the nature of the relationship 
between Christensen and Stevenson, the issue of agency 
became a matter of law, and nothing remained for deter-
mination by the trier of fact. However, it is clear that 
even where the events and circumstances may be estab-
1 islwd, a jnry question on the ultimate issue in dispute 
r<>rnains, nevertlwless, if diffen•nt inf0rences can he 
drawn from the undisputt>d facts. 
ln Abdull.:adir r. vV Pstern Pac die Railroad Company. 
1 L :.2d 53, 318 P. :2d 339 ( 1957), the court stated: 
"lt is acknowledg0d that in the face of a .Jlo-
tion for Dismissal on Summary Judgment, the 
plaintiff is entitled to have the Trial Court, and 
this Court on review, consider all of the evidence 
which the plaintiff is .able to present, and ewry 
inference and intendment fairly arising therefrom 
in the light most favorable to him." (Emphasis 
added.) 
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This is especially so where, as in this case, the de-
fendants alone are in possession of the facts concerning 
th relationship between them at the time of the accident. 
In Richards v. Anderson, 9 Utah 2d 17, 337 P. 2d 59 
( 1959), the court stated: 
""When a summary judgment is granted 
against a party, he is entitled to have the Trial 
Court, and this court on review, consider all of 
the evidence and every inference fa.irly to be de-
rived therefrom in the light most favorable to 
him." Accord, Bridge v. Backman, 10 Utah 2d 366, 
353 P. 2d 909 (1960). (Emphasis added.) 
Illustrative of this rule is the case of TannPr v. Utah 
Po11ltry Fnrmers Cooperative, 11 Ptah 2d 353, 359 P. 
:2d 18 (1961). In that case the Trial Court granted a 
sumrnar~' judg:nwnt in favor of tlw plaintiff on the ground 
that prior to tlw cornmencenwnt of the action the de-
fendant had signed a. release. Although the wording of 
the release ·was undisput0d, the intent behind the releas1• 
and the inferences to be drawn therefrom raised a jury 
qlwstion, and thus the summary judgment was sPt aside. 
In Bridge v. Bnckman, 10 Utah 2d 366, 353 P. 2d 909 
( 19GO), the issue was whether a testator had been unduly 
influenced in executing a will. 'I'he facts relevant to the 
relationship between the testator and the party who alleg-
edly exercised undue influenee were established without 
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dispute, yet summary judgment was denied upon the 
ground that the inferences to be drawn from these facts 
were subject to determination. In the course of the opin-
ion, the court stated: 
"In determining the sufficiency of the show-
ing me must view the evidence and inferences 
therefrorn in a light most favorable to the party 
against whom such judgment is sought. So, un-
less there is a showing that the disfavored party 
cannot produce evidence which would reasonably 
support a finding in their favor on a material or 
determinative issue of fact, a summary judgment 
is erroneous." (Emphasis added.) 
That reasonable minds can differ as to whether an 
a~·prn•:· n'latiomd1ip r•xistN1 in the instant case is sup-
ported hy thP following eas<>s in each of whieh an ageney 
relationship was fonnd to exist 011 facts sirnila1· to thos<· 
involYed lwn>. 
In DNJJ Roell Oil Corp. r. Fo:r, G3 P. 2d 24 (Okla., 
19:3<)), tlw plaintiff was riding his motorcycle and col-
lided "·ith a car owned by one \Yilliams and driven by 
mw Brien. The jur:' returned a verdict against the car 
(J\\'ner and employc-'r, finding that the driver's negligence 
C'aused the plaintiff's injuries. The automobile owner 
appealed the verdict upon the ground that there was 
no evidence upon which a jury could find that the driver 
,,·as the agent of the o\\·m·r at the time of the a('('.ident. 
The court upheld tlH:' verdict, however, stating that from 
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the evidence the jury was justified in finding an agency 
relationship. The court summarized the evidence upon 
which its holding was based as follows: 
"All this testimony went to the jury as being 
true, and the inferences and intendments deduct-
ible therefrom to the effect that Morris Brien (the 
driver) had procured the car from Mr. Williams 
(the owner) on that particular morning, had taken 
it to the Deep Roek Station, was servicing said 
automobile immediately before the accident, and 
did leave the service station in his uniform, driv-
ing directly toward the garage where Mr. \Vil-
liams kept his car, and while doing so was in-
volved in this accident.'' 
In Anilrfs 1". Co.r, 23 fUV. 2d 1066 (l\fo., 1930), the 
dPfrndnnt ('Ur o\\·rn·r d0liv<>1wl hPr ear to the defendant 
n·pain11an for foWl'YiCe. [t \\'US CUStOllWl'). for tlw repair-
llltlll to delivPr the car hack to the ownf>r after the com-
pletion of rPpairs. HowPYPr, upon tlw occasion in qn<>s-
tion the r0pairman took the car to the owner's home and 
found she 'ms absent. Since further repairs were re-
quired, he decided to return tlw car to the garage to 
(·nmplete tlH~'S<' fnrtlwr n•pairs. Enroute hack to tlw 
garage the repairman struck tht• plaintiff causing the in-
jmies complained of. 
The court affirnwd a jury verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff holding that tht> jury could find that the garage-
rnan was the agent of the ownC'r of the car. In the 
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rourse of the opm10n, the court noted in language par-
ticularly applicable to the present case: 
"Ridel (the repairman) was exerc1smg an in-
dependent occupation as a repairman, and ren-
dered the service of repairing the appellant's car 
in the course of such occupation, and under cir-
cumstances which made him an independent con-
tractor as to that service there seems to be no 
question, but it does not necessarily follow from 
this that he was an independent contractor as to 
the service he rend('red in an attempt to delivrr 
the car to the appellant after the repairs were 
made. The delivery of the car was no part or 
eoncomitant of his independent occupation as a 
repaIYman. 
''If the driving of the appellant's car by Ridel 
in his ath·mpt to d<·liver it to lH,r l1011w \\-as dmw, 
npon th<· eornplf'tion of the r<>pairs lw 1Yas <·m-
plo~-(·d to make, as a mere aerommodation or fa-
vor to her, and with lwr acqniesr<•neP and consPnt, 
and not in pursuance of an agreement with him 
to inelml<• this net of driYing as a part of tlw 
gern•ral ehargP inclnsivP of thP rPpairs to the ear. 
then in so driving the ear he \\-as aeting as a 
servant. and not as an inclependent contractor, 
aml if lw was acting as lwr sPrvant in so driving-
her ear home, and on arriving at hPr home found 
no onP tlwre to reeeive the car, he had implied 
authorih- to return the ear to his shop, and, if 
hP did so, 11-ithont any reqrn•st or direction from 
hPr to do so for the purpose of making further 
repairs upon it, he was, in so doing, still acting 
as her servant." 
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rrhe facts of the Andres case are indistinguishable 
from those involved in the present case since in both cases 
the repairs undertaken by the garageman were at least 
temporarily suspended and the car ·was being driven at 
the time of the accident under an implied permission of 
consent for the benefit of the owner without charge by 
the garageman. 
In Holloway v. Schield, 243 S.W. 163 (Mo., 1922), the 
defendant automobile owner drove his car to defendant's 
garage for servicing. An employee of the garage drove 
the owner to his home and while returning the car to 
the garage "ras involved in an accident. The plaintiff 
sought to hold the automobile owner liable for the negli-
gence of the garage employee. 'rhe <>ourt hPld that it was 
(•rror to find, as a matter of law, that no agpncy relation-
~hip rxist<'d. 'rlw court ronrlndrd: 
"l'nd<.'l' :o;n<:h eirenrnstan<:es, and in tlw light 
of the fon'going authorities, it cannot be held as 
a matter of law that the relation of master an<l 
st.'rvant did not exist between Schield (the owner) 
an<l the driver O'Doud. The question was for the 
jury." 
In Jimmo v. Frick, 99 A. 1005 (Pa., 1917), the de-
fonclant automobile owner had a garage employee drive 
him around on various errands and then return the car 
to the garage. An accident occm-red while the car was 
being returned. The court held the finding of agency was 
14 
jm;tified on the ground that it was the owner's business 
that the driver was engaged in, and the ovmer had a 
right to control since he could have dismissed the driver 
' directed his route, or given him any special directions. 
In Gordon 1:. Peters, 39 N.E. 2d 681 (Ill., 1942), the 
automobile owner had delivered his car to the garage-
man for cleaning. The garageman ran out of supplies 
during the cleaning process and took the car to obtain 
the supplies. ·while driving back to the garage with the 
supplies an accident occurred. The court reversed a 
jndgnwnt notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the car 
owner holding that the jury could find that the garage-
nian was the owner's agent 'd1ile obtaining tlw supplies. 
In J!rttlocks 1. Rnicrson Dru,rJ Co., 3'.3 S.\Y. :2d 1-t~ 
I ~Io., 1 !l:50). tlw ear owner, tlirnugh its agent, took an 
:u1to1nohd<' to mw Fleent-r, an mnafrur mechanic, for 
n'pairs and s<>rYieinµ:. Fl<><'Jl<'l' made many of tlw SJW{•ified 
rqlairs and tlien di:;;coverPd that hP did not have sOlllP 
of tlw Pqnip111Pnt that \';onld lw nePded to make furtlwr 
n~1Jairs. F'lPenPr drove tlw car to a m•arh~r sup11ly 110U1'<' 
tll obtain tlw net-rl<>d equi1mH·nt and was involved in an 
aC'eident. 
Tla• plaintiff therP sought to hold tlw defendant 
LnhlP for F'le<•ner's m'glig<•ncP on an ag<•ncy theory. 
l i owever, tlw 11 rial Court sustained the defendant's 
dP11rnr and tlw plaintiff appealed. 
rhe Missouri court held that the question of agency 
should not have been taken from the jury. In the course 
of the opjnion the court stated: 
"It is well to bear jn mind that whether one 
is a servant or an independent contractor in a 
given case is usually to be arrived at by inference 
from the contract, the nature of the employment, 
and all the relevant facts and circumstances; and 
that, consequently, the court will not be justified 
in taking the case from the jury, unless the facts 
and the legitimate inferences to be drawn there-
from are undisputed, and unless the evidence is 
clear and unequivocal.'' (Emphasis added.) 
So in the present case all of the relevant facts and 
infrrrncPs shonld lw \\'eiglied l1y thr triPr of fact in de-
f('rrnininµ; ih<' agpne:· qtwstion. 
Jn Clwte 'I). ~lf orey, 125 N.E. 574 (l\fass., 1920), tlw 
rqiairman was instrnekd to find what was \\'rong with 
the car, and npon discovering the problem to fix the 
ear and then to test drive it to make sure of the work. 
During the test drive the car was involved in an accident. 
The injured party sought to hold the owner liable for 
the negligence of the garage employee who was driving 
the car at the time of the accident. The court there 
lwld that the question of agency \\·as properly submitted 
to the jury and that the jury was justified in finding 
that an agency relationship existed between the owner 
and the driver. 
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In Byciak v. Neu' York Ovrrsea Conipmny, 200 N.Y.S. 
:379 (New York, 1923), an accident occurred while a 
garage employee was delivering a car to its owner. The 
court held: 
"The question should have been left to the 
jury to determine whether the turning over of the 
car to the garage keeper's employee to be returned 
to the garage was in furtherance of the defend-
ant's (owner's) business, if done as an accom-
modation and at the request of the defendant's 
representative, and, if not as an a{?commodation, 
but in pursuance of an agreement with the garage 
kt>eper to include this act of delivering as part 
of the general charge inclusive of the storage 
of the cars, that then the driving at the time of 
the accident was the act of the garage keeper's 
se>rvant, and not tliat of tlw defemlant 's (owner\;) 
seryant." 
In Ste1l'art Trui-Serrire Con1pru1y r. Roy, 95 A. 
1057 ( .:\J d., 1915), th<> ronrt held that tlw jury was jnsti-
fiNl in finding an agency relationship between the owner 
and tht> garage employc-t> wlwre the accid<:>nt occurred 
ns the latter was t<>st driving tlw ownc-r's Vt>hide snhs('-
quent to repairs. 
Jn Curry 1'. Rrnns, 285 N.\V. 88 (Nebr., 1939), as in the 
]H"PS<:>nt C'aSP, thP rrrial Court decided the agency question 
as hdwPPn the garageman and the owner as a matter 
of law. Tlw appellate court reversed, holding that the 
issue was a matter to he decided by the Jury. In the 
cours<> of tlw O})inion, the court stated: 
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"When one has contracted with a competent 
and fit person, exPrcising an independent occupa-
tion, to do a piece of work for him according to the 
contractor's own methods and without his heing 
subject to control, except as to the result of his 
\vork, the relationship is that of an independent 
contractor and not that of an agent or servant. 
''On the other hand, one who drives a car as 
a mere accommodation or favor to the owner of 
the car is the servant of the ow·ner. 
"The right of control, or the want of it, is 
determinative of the relationship; for one who has 
no right of control over another ought not to be 
required to answer for his act, and, on the other 
hand, if one has such right of control he should 
he answerable. Whether or not the right of con-
trol existed is ordinarily a 'l110stion of fart for tlw 
ju1·:,·, and is usnall_'I· arriv<'d at by infen•ncP from 
tlw terms of the rontract, tlw charndt•r of the 1•111-
ploywent, and all of tlw n·levant faets and <"i r-
C'Umstances. \VJwrP the faetR an' in d:sputr or 
rnore than onP infereneP ran lw chawn th<,r<>f"rom, 
tlw q1wstion iR for the jur_'I·." 
In ;.lforro11 r. Bolwnnan, 133 A. 607 (Conn., 192G)~ 
tlw eonrt hdd, aR a matter of law, that the delivery of 
thP automobile to the owner by an Pmployee of a garage-
rnan crPated an agency between the automobile owner 
and the garage employee. Thus, on facts similar to those 
involved in the instant case, the agency question was re-
solvPd in that C'a~w hy tlw court's holding that an agency 
frlationship did exist as a matfl'r of law. 
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The fact that the Marron case and the instant cas<' 
decided the same question differently, as a matter of 
law, illustrates the proposition that reasonable minds 
may differ as to the effect of the agency relationship 
under the facts here presented. 
The decision of the lower court is m conflict with 
the Court's decision in Morley l'. Rodberg, 7 Utah 2d 299, 
323 P. 2d 717 ( 1958), in which the plaintiffs were pedes-
trians who were struck by an automobile owned by Rod-
berg and driven by Kesler. Kesler was an automotive 
repairman and Rodberg had taken her car to him for 
repairs. He made some adjustments and then sought to 
test drive the car to determine the efficacy of his work. 
Rodberg accompanied him on the trip. During the test 
<lrive, thP acri<lPnt ocrmTP<l dlw solely to KPsler's negli-
p:Pl1('P. 
Tlw plaintiff sought to hold Rodlwrg liahle for KPs-
l(·r's negligPnce on an agency theory. Concerning tlw 
ag-t-ney relationship lwtwt>en a rneehanic and an auto-
111ohile O\\'ner, the court eoncludPd: 
"Although WP ha Ye no quarrel \\-ith th<> au-
thoritiPs cited on both sides, some of which sN'lll 
irreconcilable, \\·e an' convinced that under thP 
facts of this particular ease there was a jury 
question as to whetlwr Kesler was an agent of 
.Mrs. Rodberg, or an inde1wndent contractor, and 
that there was substantial competent 1::·videneP 
pointing to the latter status, such that on aPlwal 
the jury's veridet cannot lw distnrlH•d.'' 
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More directly in point and controlling here is the 
Utah case of Johnson v. Hardman, G Utah 2d 421, 315 P. 
2d 853, ( 1957), in which the plaintiff was a passenger in 
an automobile which collided with a car driven by one 
Child and owned by Hardman. The facts established 
that Child approached Hardman and requested that the 
latter locate a truck for Child to purchase. Hardman 
located the truck in another town and traveled with Child 
in Child's vehicle to inspect the truck. Child indicated 
a willingness to purchase the tn1ck, so Hardman pur-
chased it from the owner for the sole purpose of reselling 
it to Child upon their arrival back home. 
Hardman suggested that for the return trip home, 
Child drive the newly-acquired truck. Hardman drove 
the vehicle in which they had both travelled to see the 
yehicle which was purchased. "\Vbile driving the vehicle 
which Hardman had thus just purchased, Child collided 
with the car in which tht> plaintiff was riding. 
This Court there upheld a jury verdict in favor of 
tlw plaintiff upon the ground that Child was acting as 
the agent of Hardman at the time of the accident. The 
basis of the decision was that since Hardman was the 
owner of the truck and had requested that Child drive 
the truck, there was a sufficient basis for the jury to 
conclndt> that Child acted as Hardman 's agent: 
"The substance of the instructions was that if 
the jury found: (1) that the ownership of the 
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vehicle had not passed from Hardman to Child 
' and (2) that Hardman rquested Child to drive 
the truck back to Hardman's place of business at 
Sunset where the contract would he finally de-
termined then Hardman would he responsible. 
The jury having so regarded the evidence, \ms 
indicated by their verdict for the plaintiff. r:I'Jw 
n~quisite relationship to liability upon Hardman 
was made out." 
Thus, it can be seen that the rule of the HardmaH 
case is consistent with the many cases cited above from 
other jurisdictions and that under the facts of the present 
tase the question of agency should have been submitted to 
and determined by the trier of fact. 
CONCL-CSIOX 
tinder the rule that summary judgment is a drastic 
remedy which should bt> invoked only where the losing 
part)' could not prt>vail even though all favorable infer-
f'nCPS from the evidence are resolved in his favor, it 
was error for the lower court to rule on the agency 
question as a matter of law and remove it as an issue 
to be determined by the trier of fact upon the basis of 
all the evidence and inferences to be dra\vn therefrom. 
As the many Utah and other state authorities cited 
above illustrate, a jm;y could reasonably find an agency 
relationship from tlw precise facts involved in this casA. 
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There is ample substantial evidence in the record 
to justify submitting the agency question to the jury. 
As noted above, evidence such as that involved here has 
repeatedly been held sufficient to justify a finding of 
agency. Especially is this true in Utah where even less 
conclusive evidence on that question may be considered 
by a jury under the Goddard and Adamson cases. 
The judgment of the lower court should be reversed 
and the case remanded for trial as to both defendants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, WORSLEY & 
CHRISTENSEN 
701 Continental Bank Building-
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants 
